Governance · Proposed framework — informational only
Open Global Investment
Broad ownership open to the world, governance held apart from economics. If AGI is built once and shared by everyone, those who gain should not be limited to one country or one set of early backers — and those who decide how safely it is built should not be whoever paid the most.
The problem: a zero-sum race
AGI as a closely guarded national asset gives every capable party the same incentive: race to build it first, keep others out, and accept safety risks rather than fall behind. The pitch materials put it plainly — unilateral development incentivizes espionage, sabotage, and rushed, unsafe deployment, because each side fears exclusion and dependency. A program benefiting only one country concentrates the transition's wealth in one place and leaves everyone else with a reason to undermine it.
Open Global Investment is the proposed answer. Instead of excluding rivals, it invites them into the economic upside; instead of concentrating ownership, it spreads it widely. A party with a real stake in the safe success of the enterprise has less reason to race recklessly against it or try to seize it — undermining the enterprise would mean undermining its own stake. That is the "co-opting rivals instead of racing them" idea at the centre of the model. It is unproven, with no terms, no participants, and no track record today.
The model: decouple economics from control
The model's core mechanism is a separation ordinary ownership does not make. In a conventional company, the people who own the most economics usually control the most votes, so buying a large economic stake buys influence. Open Global Investment proposes to break that link: upside is distributed as widely as possible, while control is concentrated in high-vote shares held by stewards and the Foundation. The pitch standard calls this "democratized profit, centralized safety".
That separation is expressed in three share classes. Class A: one vote per share, full economic upside — the broad-access class. Class B: ten votes per share, economic participation plus voting — the restricted class, for aligned partners and sovereign entities meeting strict safety and geopolitical frameworks. Class C: one thousand votes per share, no economics, held exclusively by the Foundation as the ethical backstop — control only.
Class A — the broad class
One vote per share, full economic participation, designed for global public access — the class a SAFE in the proposed PBC track would convert into. Class A holders own economics, not safety decisions: a Class A majority alone cannot amend the Windfall Clause or override Class C.
Class B — the restricted class
Ten votes per share, economic participation plus voting — roughly half each in the pitch diagram. Reserved for aligned partners and sovereigns meeting strict safety and geopolitical frameworks. Class B is not open to any sovereign on demand, and buying Class A does not buy Class B votes.
Class C — the control class
One thousand votes per share, held exclusively by the Foundation, no economic participation. Even a small number dominates ordinary votes — the mechanism behind the pitch's claim that safety cannot be subjected to a hostile takeover. That control must be disclosed, not hidden behind "decoupled".
The tranches: suggested frameworks, not terms
The proposed for-profit PBC raise is organised in three tranches. Every figure here is a suggested planning framework — not a price, not a term, not a promise; the board and securities counsel must set actual terms per tranche before any solicitation.
Tranche 1 — SAFE (first money in)
The proposed first instrument is a post-money SAFE: a suggested round of $500,000 to $1,500,000, a suggested post-money cap of $8,000,000 to $15,000,000, and a discount of 20% or none — counsel and the board must choose one discount, not both. The suggested minimum is $25,000 per investor. Investors would be accredited only, under Regulation D, with a disclosure document and a Form D within 15 days of first sale. SAFEs would convert on a qualifying priced financing into Class A shares. Nothing has been issued; no cap, discount, or round size is set today.
Tranche 2 — priced equity
The proposed second stage is a priced equity round — priced preferred stock, or Class A common, as counsel advises. Its price is set at Tranche 2, not today, by the board, a lead investor, and counsel, from actual traction at that time. No Tranche 1 SAFE holder is promised a Tranche 2 price. Tranche 2 follows a milestone gate set by the board — for example, a series designated and a council seated — not a date alone if milestones are not met.
Tranche 3 — Open Global Investment
Tranche 3 is the Open Global Investment participation itself, with the Windfall Clause. It is not a SAFE, not a priced round, and not a donation — a separate program needing its own documents, not to open until Tranche 2 terms, the annual benefit report, and counsel's signed Tranche 3 terms are all in place. There are no terms for Tranche 3 today. Counsel must set the instrument, eligibility, price, governance rights, transfer and liquidity rules, and reporting before any solicitation. It must not be combined with a SAFE in one document, and no SAFE holder may be promised automatic participation unless counsel drafts that combination expressly.
Two alternative issuers — only one can be used
This must be stated plainly, because it is the easiest point in the structure to get wrong. The for-profit benefit corporation track on this page and the AGI Corp SAFE in the other planning documents are alternative issuers, not both at once for the same round. The AGI Corp SAFE was built around AGI Corp (Wyoming, intended) as issuer, with the Foundation as nonprofit mission steward. The PBC structure here builds an alternative issuer — a for-profit benefit corporation — with dual-class shares, a benefit purpose, Open Global Investment, and Windfall mechanics. Do not run an AGI Corp SAFE and a PBC SAFE for the same money, to the same investors, on different terms. Counsel must choose one issuer and one track in writing before any solicitation, so investors know which entity they are buying.
The same fork applies inside the PBC track. The filed nonprofit Foundation cannot be the issuer of a PBC SAFE. To use this structure, counsel must advise in writing on one of three paths: form a new for-profit California benefit corporation with its own filing, EIN, and bank account (never reusing the nonprofit's entity number or EIN); convert or restructure the existing entity — a major Attorney General and IRS transaction, not to be assumed available or tax-free; or run the raise through AGI Corp instead, keeping the Foundation as mission steward. Until one path is chosen in writing, this page's investment content must not be attached to the nonprofit Foundation or used to solicit investment "in the PBC".
For the nonprofit track itself, the rule is simple: the filed Foundation raises by donation and grant only. It cannot sell shares, SAFEs, convertible notes, tokens, profit participation, Class A shares, or Open Global Investment interests, and it cannot promise a donor a return, a windfall share, or a share of series profits. No SAFE by the filed nonprofit Foundation is permitted. Donations must not fund AGI Corp, a W3 series, or a SAFE round, except as a written charitable-purpose grant approved by disinterested directors, with reporting back.
Who can participate — and the screening that gates it
Broad ownership does not mean open to anyone without checks. Class A is the broad-access class: open globally, subject to securities law in each jurisdiction — in the US, Regulation D, with no general solicitation unless Rule 506(c) and verified accreditation are expressly chosen.
Class B is the restricted class, and its restriction is part of the standard. A sovereign or partner that does not meet the safety and geopolitical framework does not get Class B, and does not get Class B voting power by buying Class A instead. Any sovereign or rival participation needs, besides the offering documents, sanctions screening (OFAC), export-control review, CFIUS and national-security review where applicable, tax review, and securities advice per jurisdiction. The company may refuse, condition, or require restructuring of an investment that fails screening, even if the investor is accredited. Pitch language about inviting rival nations must never be quoted without that screening: "rivals can buy in" is not a term.
No participant is promised liquidity, a secondary market, or a buyback. The pitch phrase "guaranteed participation in the economic upside" means participation in upside if there is upside — not a guaranteed outcome. No investor is promised a foreign market, a sovereign partnership, a government contract, a tax benefit, or a distribution from the Windfall buckets. The buckets — Global Public Goods, Healthcare Access, Energy Infrastructure, Technological Self-Determination — fund UN Sustainable Development Goal projects for humanity, not investor gains.
What has no terms today — counsel must decide
Open Global Investment is a framework with blanks, not a finished program. The terms counsel must set before any solicitation are blank:
- Participation instrument: Class A shares, profit participation interests, a revenue share, or something else — counsel must choose one, with a securities analysis for that instrument. A "participation interest" that is, in substance, a security needs an offering document, whatever it is called.
- Eligibility: who may participate — accredited only, international participants, rival or sovereign participants — with securities, sanctions, tax, and anti-money-laundering advice per category. It must not be opened on website copy alone.
- Price and valuation: set at the participation offering, not today.
- Governance rights: none, information rights only, or an advisory vote — stated expressly; the default is none.
- Transfer and liquidity: none until a liquidity event, limited transfer with board approval, or another rule — stated expressly; no liquidity, secondary market, or buyback promised.
- Reporting: annual benefit and financial reporting to participants, as counsel advises.
The Windfall Clause, paired with Tranche 3, has the same status: a framework with blanks. Its threshold is a percentage of Global GDP — not a fixed dollar amount — but the percentage, the GDP measure and vintage, the profit measure, the scope, and whether measurement is annual or cumulative are blank for counsel. The share of above-threshold profits flowing to humanity is called "a massive portion" in the pitch, but no number is given, so none is stated here. Administrator, segregated account, enforceability, and survival on a sale, merger, or change of control are all blank for counsel. The pitch obligation runs to the 33 W3 series, not only to the benefit corporation. Until the blanks are filled, the Windfall Clause must not be described as "triggered at $X" — see the companion Windfall Clause page for the draft clause and its blanks.
How it fits the wider system — and what must happen first
Open Global Investment is one of three interlocking parts, with the Fiduciary Shield — expanded business-judgment protection for benefit-considering decisions, not immunity from shareholder lawsuits, which the pitch overstated and the legal documents correct — and the Windfall Clause, the pre-commitment to share profits above a threshold with humanity. The share structure and Steward Council pages give the detail.
Control is not ownership, and no series exists to participate in until series are designated: the 33 named W3 sub-series come from an April 2026 internal list, not a Wyoming filing.
Before anyone could participate, the planning documents require a sequence, in order: counsel chooses the issuer in writing; the issuer is filed and confirmed, with Articles carrying the benefit purpose, good standing, a matching EIN, bylaws, a board, and a bank account in its own name; the site presents one issuer and one solicitation channel — private offering documents only; the board authorises Tranche 1 with one cap, one discount, and one round size, with a disclosure document and risk factors; Tranche 1 closes with accredited investors only and a Form D within 15 days of first sale; a milestone gate leads to the Tranche 2 priced round; and only then are Tranche 3 terms drafted and signed by counsel — never promised inside Tranche 1 or 2 documents. That sequence has not started: no issuer chosen, no for-profit benefit corporation formed, no SAFE issued, no Tranche 3 terms exist. And the direct answer: no, nobody can participate now — there is no participation program, no instrument, no price, and no eligibility list. Above the Windfall threshold, a share of profits is committed away from shareholders by design; that cost must be disclosed to any future participant.
Inquiries go to [email protected] for information only: no offering documents exist, no terms can be quoted, and no commitment can be made from this page.
Sources: the PBC raise structure (file 29), the Windfall Clause and Open Global Investment pitch standards (file 31), the per-entity raise advice (file 27), the draft PBC SAFE (file 44), and the truth audit (file 52). Suggested figures are illustrative only, never prices, terms, or promises. Where the files say counsel must decide, this page says exactly that.