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AGI Future Foundation PBC

Governance · Share Structure

Three classes of shares. One decoupling: profit for the many, control for the mission.

The proposed structure separates who benefits economically from AGI from who decides whether it is safe. Class A spreads the upside widely. Class B gives screened partners and sovereigns a larger voice. Class C gives the Foundation alone the voting control to hold the safety mission steady.

Compare the three classesWhy decouple?

1 voteClass A — per share
10 votesClass B — per share
1,000 votesClass C — per share, Foundation-only

The idea in one paragraph

AGI kept as a closely guarded national asset would concentrate wealth and power, and give every rival a reason to race, spy, sabotage, or deploy unsafely. The Open Global Investment model answers that incentive: invite the world — including rival nations — to share in the economic upside, so destroying or racing the enterprise becomes economic self-destruction. But broad ownership cannot mean broad control over safety, or the mission could be bought or outvoted. So the structure decouples the two: economics widely through Class A, governance concentrated in Class B and, decisively, in Class C, held exclusively by the Foundation. Democratized profit, centralized safety.

The three classes, compared

ClassVotes per shareEconomic participationHolder / accessTransfer / conversion
Class A1Full — fully participates in economic upside, up to the Windfall thresholdGlobal public access; the broad-access class of the Open Global Investment modelTransfer rules to be set by counsel; no conversion to Class C
Class B10Yes — economic participation plus voting (roughly half economic, half voting in the pitch diagram)Restricted — aligned partners and sovereigns meeting strict safety and geopolitical frameworks only; screened for sanctions, export controls, and CFIUSTransfer only to a qualified holder, or converts to Class A on transfer to a non-qualified holder — counsel to set
Class C1,000None — control only (voting power only, no economic participation)Exclusively the Foundation, as the ultimate ethical backstopNon-transferable except to a successor Foundation board or trustee as the Articles provide; conversion or cancellation trigger — counsel to set

Votes versus economics, at a glance

Gold is economic participation; navy is voting power. Class A is almost entirely economics with a small vote. Class B balances the two. Class C is voting power only.

Votes vs. economics — the three classes Gold = economic participation · Navy = voting power · Bar lengths are illustrative, not share counts Class A — 1 vote Almost entirely profit participation, small voting power Class B — 10 votes Roughly half economic participation, half voting power Class C — 1,000 votes Voting only — no economics

Class A — 1 vote per share: the global public's class

Class A is optimized for global public access and widespread wealth distribution, and it fully participates in the economic upside — up to the Windfall threshold, above which the Windfall Clause redirects excess profits to humanity. In the pitch diagram, Class A is almost entirely profit participation, with only a small slice of voting power — deliberate: Class A is how the world shares in the value AGI creates, without handing safety decisions to the smallest voters.

"Widely open" does not mean open to anyone, anywhere, without checks: in the United States, Class A is subject to securities law per jurisdiction — Regulation D, with no general solicitation unless Rule 506(c) plus investor verification is expressly chosen — and participation never carries a guarantee of liquidity, a secondary market, or a buyback. "Guaranteed participation in the economic upside" means participation in upside if there is upside, not a guaranteed return. Class A holders are told upfront what they are buying into: economics, not control.

Class B — 10 votes per share: restricted, aligned partners and sovereigns

Class B carries ten votes per share and is both economic and voting — roughly half economic participation and half voting power in the pitch diagram. It is reserved for restricted, aligned partners and sovereign entities meeting strict safety and geopolitical frameworks. That restriction is part of the standard: Class B is not open to any sovereign on demand, and a sovereign that does not meet the framework does not get Class B — and does not get Class B voting power by buying Class A instead.

Any sovereign or rival participation needs, in addition to the offering documents, sanctions screening (OFAC), export-control and CFIUS / national-security review where applicable, and tax and securities advice per jurisdiction. Do not pitch "rivals can buy in" without that screening. The strategic logic is that a heavily invested adversary has a vested interest in the Foundation's secure, safe success — but that only works if admitted Class B participants are actually aligned and actually screened, which is why the framework, the qualified-holder definition, and the screening criteria are all blanks for counsel to set before any Class B solicitation.

Class C — 1,000 votes per share: Foundation-only, control-only

Class C carries 1,000 votes per share and is held exclusively by the Foundation to maintain absolute, unshakeable ethical control. The sources state its economics plainly: Class C is control only, with no economic participation. This page states exactly what the sources say and invents nothing further about Class C economics: no separate economic return, dividend, liquidation, or profit share for Class C is described in the papers.

The voting math is the mechanism. At 1,000 votes per share, even a small number of Class C shares dominates Class A at one vote and Class B at ten votes on any ordinary vote. That is how the Foundation acts as the ultimate ethical backstop: shielding the profit-generating series from hostile market pressures, keeping operations consistent with AI safety and equitable distribution, and preventing ruthless profit maximization from overriding the mission. The Foundation's control over the W3 series runs through Class C control at the PBC level, mission and voting agreements with each series, and each series' Steward Council mission gate — not through owning each series' economics. Control is not ownership.

Two limits stay visible. First, founders must not be issued Class C: it is Foundation control for the mission, not founder control; founder placement is a counsel decision, and the offering documents must state in one paragraph who holds each class and why. Second, Class C is non-transferable except to a successor Foundation board or trustee as the Articles provide, and counsel is to set a conversion or cancellation trigger so control does not become a perpetual unaccountable block.

How the decoupling works — and why it matters

Economics go wide

Class A opens the upside to the global public, and Class B extends it to screened partners and sovereigns. Broad ownership reduces expropriation risk and gives many parties a vested interest in safe success.

Control stays narrow

Class B's ten votes give aligned partners a real voice, but Class C's 1,000 votes keep decisive control with the Foundation. Safety decisions cannot be outvoted by an economic majority.

The Shield backs it up

As a California benefit corporation, the board must consider the public benefit purpose alongside shareholder interests, with expanded business-judgment protection for decisions made in good faith. That is not immunity: the pitch deck's "legally immune" claim overstates California law and must never be repeated in legal documents.

Disclosure follows the decoupling: the Windfall Clause must be presented as a cost, not a benefit, and Foundation control as a governance fact, not a guarantee. The classes describe the PBC issuer — not ownership of any individual W3 series, which are separate entities with no pooled economics by default.

How the classes serve Open Global Investment and the Windfall Clause

Open Global Investment needs Class A genuinely broad and Class B genuinely restricted: a narrow Class A would leave the world no participation and restore the incentive to race, while an open Class B would let unscreened holders buy voting weight the framework was meant to gate. Counsel must still set the instrument (one choice, with a securities analysis), eligibility, price, governance rights (default: none), transfer and liquidity (no liquidity, secondary market, or buyback promised), and reporting. It is not a SAFE, not a priced round, and not a donation.

The Windfall Clause needs control strong enough, and durable enough, to survive the moment profits arrive. It is a legal pre-commitment, hardwired before the profits are generated: profits above a set threshold are redistributed globally, and the obligation in the pitch runs to the 33 W3 series, not only to the PBC. The threshold is a percentage of Global GDP — not a fixed dollar amount — and the share above it is described in the pitch only as "a massive portion." Neither number is in the pitch, and this page invents neither: threshold percentage, GDP measure and vintage, profit measure, measurement scope, Windfall Share percentage, administrator, and audit and reporting mechanics are all blanks for the board and counsel. Below the threshold, the pitch provides standard economic returns to Class A and Class B holders and retained funding for research and development. Above it, the excess is Windfall Profits, distributed to the benefit buckets the pitch names — Global Public Goods, Healthcare Access, Energy Infrastructure, and Technological Self-Determination — for projects advancing the UN Sustainable Development Goals.

That is where Class C does its most important work. A Windfall Clause amendable by a simple board majority at the moment profits arrive would not be a pre-commitment at all. So the draft clause may be amended, suspended, or repealed only by a supermajority vote — for example, a stated percentage of Class C plus a stated percentage of Class A and Class B voting as separate classes, plus Foundation board approval — with counsel to set a threshold that allows amendment in a genuine emergency but not by a simple majority when profits arrive. An amendment that reduces the Windfall Share, raises the threshold, or removes a benefit bucket, adopted without that vote, is void under the draft. The clause is not yet in force: it takes effect only when adopted by the required votes and filed where required.

Illustrative cap-table figures — models only, not terms

Everything in this section is illustrative only, drawn from the cap-table models in the paperwork, using suggested valuations to show the mathematics of dilution. They are not allocations, not prices, not promises, and not a cap table of record. No shares are issued, no percentages are promised, no round is priced, and no share price is presented on this page. If the board sets different caps, pools, or splits, the mathematics changes — the model must be re-run before anything is signed.

Illustrative modelAssumptions (illustrative)Illustrative outcome
AGI Corp studio — formation, SAFE, priced roundFounders 10,000,000 common shares at formation; $2,000,000 studio SAFE at a $20,000,000 post-money cap; then a $5,000,000 priced round at $25,000,000 pre-money, with a 15% option pool created pre-moneyFounders roughly 58–63% fully diluted; SAFE holders about 10%; option pool 15%; new investors about 16.7%. The exact founder percentage depends on whether the pool is 15% of pre- or post-money and on the SAFE stacking order.
For-profit PBC track — first raiseSuggested $50,000,000 pre-money (for-profit PBC track only); first raise $5,000,000If priced as equity at $50,000,000 pre-money, illustratively 9.1% to new investors on a $55,000,000 post-money; if a SAFE at a $50,000,000 cap, 10.0% to SAFE holders at conversion — before the priced round's dilution and pool shuffle.

What the studio model shows is that founders who start at 100% do not stay there. A $2,000,000 SAFE at a $20,000,000 cap is 10% at conversion by itself; a $5,000,000 priced round at $25,000,000 pre-money is 16.7% to new investors on a $30,000,000 post-money; and a 15% option pool created pre-money is paid for by the existing holders — founders, not the new investor. The resulting founder range of roughly 58–63% fully diluted is normal for a seed-stage sequence. That is why founder control after a Series A depends on board seats, a voting agreement, and (in the PBC track) Class C Foundation control, not on holding more than 50% of the economics.

What is still undecided — and who decides it

The share structure is a draft framework, and the papers are explicit about what remains blank. None of the following is settled: the issuer fork (one choice, in writing, by counsel, before any solicitation); authorized share counts; the Class B framework; the Class C transfer, conversion, and cancellation triggers; founder placement; Windfall terms (threshold, measures, scope, share, administrator, audit, survival on sale or merger); Open Global Investment terms (instrument, eligibility, price, governance, transfer, reporting); and raise terms (SAFE cap and discount, round size, milestones, option pool, platform and exemption).

What this page is not

This page is informational only. It is not an offering of securities, not a solicitation of investment, not a promise of any return, and not a statement that any share, SAFE, or participation interest is available to buy. It does not present any share price, any valuation as a price, or any illustrative percentage as an allocation. It does not claim that any site, union, customer, revenue, or signed agreement exists — none is named here, because none is evidenced in the files reviewed. It does not claim the Foundation is tax-exempt or donations tax-deductible. And it does not name any founder allocation, or list any person as a director, officer, or co-founder of a for-profit entity on the basis of the papers reviewed — founder identities, roles, and acceptances are to be confirmed in writing before any issuance.

Nothing on this page is legal, tax, or financial advice. The share structure, the Open Global Investment model, and the Windfall Clause described here are draft, proposed terms for a for-profit benefit corporation track that is not yet formed, and every bracketed item requires board and counsel decisions before any solicitation or issuance.